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J. L. Mackie, opposing Christian theism, argues in support of the famed 
problem of evil. He concludes his argument with a version of the paradox of om­
nipotence. A refutation of this paradox does in no way alleviate the entire problem 
of evil, but it does assist in making Christianity more reasonable. Prior to this 
task I will first state this paradox in full, and next enumerate the consequence for 
the theist; then a reconciliation and problem solving can begin. 
I would endeavor to give a possible answer, a defense, to Mackie's charge 
and conclude. contrary to Mackie, that it is most probable God has a good reason 
for not intervening to halt the wrong willing people do. I charge that ifit were the 
case. God did intervene each time someone willed to do moral evil (which is the 
type of evil this paper is confined to), we would no longer have free will (hereafter 
FW). FW could be called a more important or greater good than the lack of both 
evil and FW, Le. it seems plausible that the evil allowed in the world by FW could 
be outweighed by the immense good of having FW. 
First. what is claimed in the paradox of omnipotence? Mackie states that 
there is a fundamental difficulty in the notion of an omnipotent 
God creating men with free will, for if men's wills are really 
free this must mean that even God cannot control them, that 
is, that God is no longer omnipotent. (Mackie 230) 
This says that if we humans have FW then God is not omnipotent. Later in the 
article Mackie reformulates the paradox explicitly by posing the questions "can an 
omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or...make 
rules which then bind himself? (Mackie 231). It is imperative that the carefully 
reading theist understand how Mackie uses "cannot." 
Does Mackie give thoughtful and correct support for bringing in the strong 
term "cannot"? I think that he does not and I argue also that Mackie does not ade­
quately treat the rebuttal that Christian theists typically set forth, namely that 
God has the ability to control human wills but refrains from doing so. 
Unfortunately, Mackie's support comes in the form of the above two rhetorical 
questions, which is a poor way to support a position. The question he poses with 
which we must grapple is "why should he [God] not leave men free to will rightly, 
but intervene when he sees them beginning to will wrongly?" (Mackie 230). I 
assume Mackie is implying that there is no reasonable answer to this question. 
Mackie wants to use "cannot" in reference to God's inability to control beings with 
FW, so if we find a plausible answer to this question, God would be found to have a 
possible reason why he would choose not to control human wills when they will 
wrongly. Our first task, before giving such a response, is to determine more pre­
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cisely what Mackie intends to claim with this rhetorical question, reforming it to 
render the query more understandable. 
What does Mackie mean by using the term "will"? Understanding 
Mackie's use of this term is essential. It is possible that "will" could merely mean 
a choice, staying in the mind, e.g. I am able to will, or choose, to have Fruit Loops 
rather than Raisin Bran tomorrow for breakfast. I would reject this as Mackie's 
understanding, however, for I do not think he intends to ask why God would not 
intervene when he knows humans are willinfi or haye willed evil choices, but 
rather when he sees them ready to act upon those choices. Mackie is not defining 
"will" as choice in thought only, but in action as well. The term "free will" is 
most often understoQd by society in this form; governmental laws are meant to 
punish for the acted out choices of the will. Mackie refers to "man's choices and 
consequent actions" but without specific reference to defining "will" (Mackie 230). 
Given this allusion and the above information we must take this as Mackie's defi­
nition of "will." 
The question he raises now becomes, "why should God not leave men free to 
will, to determine both choices and carry out actions based on those choices, 
rightly, but intervene when he sees them beginning to will, determine choices and 
carry out actions, wrongly?" By "intervene" I understand Mackie to mean 
"control and put a halt to" this evil or wrong act of willing. Mackie is not 
thoroughly clear here either and he may intend to convey merely "influence," 
perhaps in the form of a divine voice. I will however make his claim stronger, 
based on his parallel use of the term "controlling" in the previous sentence 
(Mackie 230). Now it is seen that Mackie asks, "why should God not allow men to 
will and act rightly and put a ·halt to their would-be subsequent action when they 
will wrongly?" By "wrongly", I take Mackie to mean "evilly," because he uses 
these terms interchangeably, as will 1. 
The consequence for the theist is fairly clear. If Mackie's question is 
without a reasonable response then it would seem Christian theism is incoherent. 
Traditional Christians include an omnipotent and wholly good God in their set of 
beliefs. Mackie seems to claim that the point of conflict is that this God would 
need to halt all the evil willing in order to be consistent with his supposed 
metaphysical attributes. 
Thankfully, the answ:er is not as complex as forming the understandable 
question we have before us from Mackie's original. Is there a possible reason why 
God should not do this? Let us, by analogy, suppose that God did in fact put a halt 
to someone's acting out of a wrong will and that eating Fruit Loops is decidedly 
wrong. I am infatuated with Fruit Loops but ~instancein which I attempt to 
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-everything. I have tried eating them in many different locations and even in 
different positions, but fortunately, I have never been successful in my attempt. 
Do I have a FW in regard to the eating ofFruit Loops? No, I do not. Recall 
that Mackie and I defined FW as more than a mental choice, to include the conse· 
quent action the choice may bring about. I am no longer .ab!e...to freely will myself 
to eat Fruit Loops because some force has prevented me from doing so; Le., since 
I am halted every time I try to partake of them, I am left without the FW to eat 
them, because to have FW means to possess a mental choice and to act on that 
choice if I so desire. IfGod intervened, or halted, the evil willings that humans 
do then humans would no longer have a FW. Thus, the good reason God may 
possibly have for not intervening is the maintenance of human FW. 
Mackie's conclusion hinges on what he think's he's shown, namely that a 
wholly good, omnipotent God should "leave men free to will rightly, but intervene 
when he sees them beginning to will wrongly" (Mackie 230). However, God may 
have a good reason for not intervening. Namely that if he were to intervene every 
time humans began to "will wrongly", then those humans would no longer have a 
FW, since will is both thinking a choice and acting it out. So, it is quite plausible 
that God chooses not to control human wills because the freedom of will is a 
greater good than the evil which results from willing wrongly, making and acting 
on evil decisions. Mackie then states that "if God could do this, but does not, and if 
he is wholly good, the only explanation could be that even a wrong free act of will 
is not really evil, that its freedom is a value which outweighs its wrongness..." 
<Mackie 230-31). 
Mackie ends this passage by saying that the FW solution of the problem 
"can be maintained only in the form that God has made men so free that he 
cannot control their wills" (Mackie 231). This leaves Mackie's next argument of 
advocating the paradox of omnipotence on unsure ground because he states that 
the paradox raises the question, "can an omnipotent being make things which he 
cannot subsequently control" (Mackie 231). Certainly having a good reason for 
refraining from control and lacking the ability to control are two wholly different 
circumstances. Dissenting with Mackie's argument, I maintain it is consistent 
to claim that God has the ability to controlhuman FW but chooses not to for a 
plausible reason. 
It may be argued, in defense of Mackie, that we cannot have FW if God is 
omnipotent. However, it seems very reasonable that God is able to lmm beings 
FW. This is not to say that he is limited because the FWs are free, and thus un­
controllable by God, but rather that they are free and can be controlled by God, but 
43 
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Iare not currently under His control. Mackie uses an analogy, speaking of the 
paradox of omnipotence in terms of a paradox of sovereignty. He asks, "could the 
British parliament make a law forbidding any future parliament to socialize 
banking, and also forbidding the future repeal of this law itself?" (Mackie 231). 
This does not parallel the situation that God faces. It would be more useful to con­
ceive of this situation as FW being a special loan to humans from God, which is 
potentially subject to change from moment to moment. He is able to take it away 
and is not le~ally bound to continue refraining from controlling our wills. Judeo­
Christian scripture records no pact or law in which God says he will grant us FW 
forever. An omnipotent and omnibenevolent God has the ability to determine the 
wills of humans, but presumably does not do this most of the time. 
However, there seems to be a problem in holding the troublesome and 
tenuous conclusion that God refrains from controlling the wills of humans (given 
our definition of FW that includes the mental choice and...consequent action) and 
yet miracles do happen; for any single miracle in which God violates someone's 
FW, means that at some point in time that person was without FW. A few 
illustrations would be useful, even though finding the perfect one is difficult. 
Suppose that I have a vendetta against Daniel and therefore I make the premed­
itated mental choice to kill him. I then actualize this choice by dismembering him 
so that he is undoubtedly dead. Next I realize that his six parts are suddenly re­
forming before my eyes; he is back together and whole instantly. Dan tells me 
that it was a miracle. The question to decide is whether or not he is consistent in 
holding that God has loaned humans FW, and maintaining that such a miracle 
occurred and was willed by his God. 
Ifa miracle took place and God intervened to heal Dan, and ifFW is defined 
to include both choice and action, then it follows that I, the murderer of Dan, was 
relieved, however briefly, from possessing FW. This is because the consequent 
action I had performed was changed, reversed in this case. The Christian could 
reply to this argument in one of three ways. First, one may say that this analogy 
is nonsensical because no miracles in similar fashion are purported to happen in 
the New Testament. On this point Mackie and I may agree, but this does in no 
way seriously damages the argument. All that needs to be shown is that some­
one's FW has been ignored or taken away, even though there is not such an 
obvious example in scripture as the previous one. 
Take the crucifixion of Jesus as an example. It is quite clear that many 
people wanted him dead and it suffices for my purposes to suppose that only one of 
them reallY wanted him dead. This person actualized this desire and assisted in 
crucifying Jesus. If Jesus rises from the dead then the murderer's FW, namely 
44 
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br my purposes to suppose that only one of 
son actualized this desire and assisted in 
,e dead then the murderer's FW, namely 
the consequent action, is taken from him. Here the Christian may object to say 
that that person only "assisted" in the death and did not actualize it himself. The 
Christian must then say that the Roman soldier responsible for nailing Jesus to 
the cross did not desire, or make the mental choice to kill Jesus. This seems to 
me quite improbable, but reasonable enough to cause this example some 
difficulty. 
The same could be said of the recorded instance in which Peter apparently 
makes the mental choice of cutting off an ear of one of the people who came to 
capture Jesus at the Garden of Gethsemane and then actualized it. Jesus clearly 
violated Peter's FW by healing the soldier's ear, but the Christian may claim that 
by that time the mental choice of Peter had changed, Peter had repented, and 
therefore he desired Jesus to restore the injured soldier's ear. Jesus' action then 
did not violate Peter's will. Even though this seems rather counterintuitive and is 
non-scriptural, it may yet have some intuitive plausibility. 
It seems that the miracles in the New Testament are mostly, if not entirely 
of the sort that FW may be left intact, Le. miracles are performed on paralytics, 
lepers and other people with illnesses: people who probably made the mental 
choice to be healed. In most instances, the people receiving the miraculous action 
wanted it to happen to them. In the performance of the miracle, neither the men­
tal choice nor the consequent action of another human was infringed upon, Le. 
others did not choose and act on someone to make them paralyzed. New 
Testament claims aside, however, if in this instance a Christian does claim that 
Dan was healed by God, then my FW was infringed upon. It is impossible to think 
that humans have FW and also maintain that Dan was miraculously healed from 
wounds inflicted by my chainsaw unless they recognize that my FW was taken 
from me. 
Another objection a second Christian theist would pose is that my definition 
of FW is improper and not in accord with his or her own Christian 
understanding. One would then probably choose to define FW as only a mental 
choice and not the consequent action, limiting the scope of the term. This 
presents a grave problem because if one wants to maintain this definition then 
one must say that God does control the consequent actions that people will. This 
leaves one open to a fatal blow from an advocate of the problem of evil. IfGod ~ 
control our actions and n21 our mental choices then he must be directly 
responsible for all the moral evil in the world. This theist must give up the FW 
defense for it would be totally undermined. 
Thirdly, and most formidably, the Christian may say that God's 
miraculous healing of Dan is not an infringement on my FW because God was not 
45 
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intervening with my consequent action. In other words, she would care to sepa­
rate the results of my action (Dan's death) from the actual act of sawing his limbs 
off. Whereas the second objector wished to include only statement one in the 
definition, this third objector would draw the line between two and three. 
This latter has some force for it would seem that once the consequent action is fin­
ished then my exercise of FW in this situation is also. 
However, I would disagree, finding that separating the results from the ac­
tion is quite difficult in many circumstances without having the original mental 
choice violated. Imagine again that I desire to kill Dan and actualize this mental 
choice by killing him. It is possible to want to kill Dan for a few different reasons, 
at least two of which seem relevant. First, I should be doing it for the thrill the act 
itself, severing limbs with a chainsaw, gives me, Le. it may be done for 
excitement. IT this is the case then I believe this third objection would hold true 
because having Dan dead is not necessarily a part of my mental choice. Second, 
what ifhaving Dan dead were part of my mental choice? IT the reason behind my 
desire to kill Dan is that I really want him to be dead, then it would seem that if 
God resurrected him then my FW would be taken from me. This would be the 
case because God would have violated my mental choice for Dan to be dead, 
because the result of my subsequent action is undone by this miraculous action. 
This third objection is a sound one, but it does not totally destroy my argument, 
even though it does weaken it. The rebuttal would work for situations of FW 
where the mental choice was acted upon due to a feeling of stimulation, etc., 
received from the acting itself. I would think, though, that this holds true for very 
few incidents of FW where God would perform a miracle. For example, some of 
the people shouting "Crucify him!" were surely thrill-seekers wanting to see a 
body on a cross at Golgotha, but many, ifnot most, actually wanted Jesus dead, 
permanently. 
Miracles however, are not the only Christian anomaly in jeopardy of con­
flicting with FW. I would argue that many forms of intercessory prayer intend to 
violate the FW of the one who is being prayed for. In fact, I would argue that this 
is quite common because much of the time intercessory prayer is implemented 
(excluding healings) it is used so that God will "correct" someone's life and 
change it to be in accord with the Christian ethic. For example, my mom prays 
that God would "help" me stop smoking; "help" could mean a number of different 
things. Probably, she would ~ that I myself wanted to quit and I act on that 
supposed mental choice. However, since it is not my desire to discontinue 
smoking, she could pray for one of two series of events, both of which, ifGod actu­
alized, would infringe upon my FW . 
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First, she could pray for God to ~ me the desire to quit smoking, but here 
this "give" would contradict the mental choice of my wanting to smoke. Secondly, 
"help" might mean that my mom wishes God would force me to quit in some way, 
thereby inhibiting either my mental choice about the matter or the action. IfGod 
forced the notion into my mind that cigarettes are in actuality dog feces I would 
quit (this is quite similar to the first instance). God could, on the other hand, 
always make cigarettes unavailable to me, perhaps by never permitting a cashier 
to sell them to me. In any case, if these prayers were actualized by God I would 
no longer have FW in regard to smoking. 
In effect, my mom was praying for a miracle to happen, and this type of 
miracle would violate my FW unless I did in fact want to quito-which I do not. 
The action of my mom praying for this does not affect my FW. Only if God did 
intervene would it, and if he did my mom would logically be committed to 
admitting that I was without FW for a time. There are implications from this 
that surface when using the FW defense for the problem of evil. 
Ifmy mother would want to say that God has given humanity FW because 
it is what makes the greater good and if she prays for me in this way then she 
must say that she wants God to take FW away; i. e., she wishes God "Indian give" 
or squelch on his "loan" ofFW to humans. When this occurs it seems that the 
"greater good" of human FW is now in jeopardy if it is even still in existence. If 
she objects to Mackie by saying that God does not intervene every time people will 
wrongly because this would take away FW from humans, then by wanting 
wanting God to occasionally intervene, it follows that she would want the FW of 
certain humans to be negated on occasion. 
It is rational for a theist to suppose that moral evil is consistent with the ex­
istence of God, the means to this being the FW defense. However, once the theist 
accepts this and simultaneously wants to hold that some miracles have happened 
which do violate FW, it follows that rationally held belief in God is in jeopardy. 
Earlier I claimed that FW is a loan to humans from God. I have shown that most 
Christians must say that some of the miracles they posit have violated FW; God 
broke the loan. 
So what does it matter, retorts the theist, that God has violated FW in per­
forming some miracles or in granting intercessory prayers? It is quite relevant 
actually, because it would seem that God should violate FW in all the applicable 
situations. Therefore according to the theist, God presently selects some very few 
cases in which to do this. If he has taken away FW once, e.g., stopping me from 
smoking, then for what reason does he not stop someone from murdering 
another? 
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First, what has become of this greater good that FW produced? Surely, ac­
cording to the FW defense, it is highly valued, so much so that God permits it to 
cause unfathomable degrees of human and animal pain. Proportionate to this 
surety, so must this greater good go down in flames. Second, without FW man 
cannot justly be said to be made in the image of God. Somehow humans are 
degraded into being mere puppets rudely attached to the strings God pulls--or 
doesn't pull--randomly. 
Last, it is philosophically much more safe to say that God has never done a 
miracle which violated FW than to say he has done some and not others in cases, 
as above, which would obviously merit a violation of FW, unless of course the 
Christian would care to step back with the word "faith." It would be consistent for 
God either not to violate FW at all or violate it each time evil is willed, rendering 
humans with no FW. The latter is obviously not the case and, according to the 
theist, neither is the former. The alternative, to have a situation where God picks 
and chooses with seemingly little discretion whose FW to violate is extremely 
untenable. Unfortunately, it seems that complete certainty cannot be reached; 
this point is not logically inconsistent, but certainly, at the least, is non-reason­
able. 
In this paper I have set forth a plausible alternative to Mackie's suggestion 
that the only good reason God would have for not intervening when humans begin 
to will wrongly would be that acts of evil are not really evil. This alternative 
solution is that ifGod did intervene every time humans willed wrongly then 
humans would no longer have FW and possessing the good of FW would outweigh 
the evil which results from it. In this manner,I side with the Christian. 
However, in regard to the compatibility of some miracles and intercessory prayers 
I would stand at odds with the Christian. Ifone takes this FW defense combined 
with the "greater good" option, when FW is taken away from humans by God 
doing some miracles Christians claim he has, then the greater good caused by the 
FW also disappears. As of yet, there has been no reasonable argument presented 
to contest my argument that some happenings which Christians call miracles, if 
they are such, merit the violation of someone's FW. This presents problems for 
the Christian who wishes to bridge the two. The theist's position here is that of on 
a fence. In any event, the nuances of such intriguing argumentation should 
encourage further debate. ' 
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